Foreign subsidiaries as channel of international technology diffusion. Some direct firm level evidence from Belgium by Cassiman, Bruno & Veugelers, Reinhilde
FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES AS A CHANNEL OF 
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION.
SOME DIRECT FIRM LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM BELGIUM
Reinhilde Veugelers*
Bruno Cassiman**
RESEARCH PAPER No 441
September, 2001
* Professor of Applied Economics, Catholic University of Leuven





08034 Barcelona - Spain
Copyright © 2001, IESE
Do not quote or reproduce without permission
IESE
UNIVERSITY OF NAVARRAFOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES AS A CHANNEL OF 
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION.
SOME DIRECT FIRM LEVEL  EVIDENCE FROM BELGIUM
Abstract
The use of FDI as a channel of international spillovers is by now fairly established in
the  empirical  literature  on  innovation  and  growth.  It  is  often  argued  that  subsidiaries  of
foreign  MNEs  are  a  mechanism  through  which  technological  know-how  flows  across
borders. For foreign subsidiaries to be channels of international spillovers, these subsidiaries
need to source know-how internationally and at the same time transfer their know-how to the
local  economy.  Using  direct  firm  level  evidence  from  Belgian  CIS-survey  data  on  the
occurrence of technology transfers, we find that foreign subsidiaries are indeed more likely to
acquire  technology  internationally.  But  once  controlled  for  the  superior  access  to  the
international technology market that foreign subsidiaries enjoy, we find that these firms are
not  more  likely  to  transfer  technology  to  the  local  economy.  This  suggests  that  foreign
subsidiaries  are  not  necessarily  interesting  sources  for  local  transfers.  What  seems  to  be
important  for  local  technology  transfers  is  having  an  international  network  that  provides
access to international technology.
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1. Introduction
Ever since innovation was identified as an important driver of economic growth,
policy makers have had a keen interest in understanding how the process of developing and
integrating new knowledge in the innovation process leads to successful innovation. The
prosperity of a country is expected to rise with the ability to access available new knowledge,
which is relevant for the innovation process. Hence, it is important to stimulate the channels
through  which  external  technological  information  flows.  The  models  of  endogenous
innovation-driven growth (a.o. Grossman & Helpman (1991)) have placed the subject of
knowledge spillovers at the forefront of research.
There is no reason for knowledge spillovers to be confined to domestic borders.
Building further on endogenous growth models, the current empirical literature identifies the
international transfer of technology as an important source for growth (e.g. Helpman (1997);
but  see  Rodriguez  &  Rodrik  (1999)  for  a  more  skeptical  view  on  previous  empirical
literature).  Different  channels  are  considered  through  which  international  technology
transfers  occur.  The  majority  of  empirical  studies  follow  Coe  and  Helpman  (1995)  in
analyzing the diffusion of technological know-how embodied in trade flows. Domestic firms
can  learn  from  the  foreign  goods  they  import  by  reverse  engineering  the  technological
innovations embodied in these goods. But there are other means through which technological
knowledge  can  flow  across  national  boundaries.  An  obvious  alternative  is  foreign  direct
investment,  since  the  production  and/or  research  activities  undertaken  by  multinational
affiliates can confer “spillover” benefits to the local economy. The empirical evidence on
spillover benefits from FDI, relying on indirect measures for spillovers, have generally failed
to find robust evidence of positive knowledge spillovers from multinational investment (see
Mohnen (2001) for a review). Despite the body of empirical research on the topic, and given
the widespread belief among policymakers that FDI is good for growth, it is surprising that
the link between technology transfers from FDI and growth is still a black box. Whether
subsidiaries of foreign firms indeed are channels of international spillovers and hence will be
interesting sources of technology transfers to the local economy requires both that foreign
subsidiaries source international technology and that they transfer this technology to the local
market.  But  little  is  known  about  the  conditions  and  mechanisms  through  which
multinational firms do indeed transfer technology. Without a clearer understanding of this, it
is difficult to know what sorts of FDI are consistent with growth and to distinguish positive
from negative effects of FDI. This paper goes further than the existing literature, which relies on indirect measures
for  international  spillovers  through  FDI.  In  this  paper  we  explore  direct  measures  of
technology transfers, obtained from survey data on Belgian manufacturing firms from the
Eurostat Community Innovation Survey. We identify which firms transfer technology to the
local economy, comparing foreign subsidiaries with domestic firms. At the same time, the
data  allow  to  identify  whether  firms  have  acquired  technology  internationally.  Various
embodied and disembodied technology transfer and acquisition mechanisms are considered,
both  from  external  partners  and  internal  transfers  from  headquarters  to  foreign  affiliates.
Therefore we are able to disentangle the two conditions for having foreign subsidiaries as
mechanisms for international technology spillovers. First they need to source international
know-how and second, they need to transfer know-how to the local economy.
The  main  results  of  the  paper  are  that  companies  that  are  sourcing  technology
internationally are more active in generating local know-how transfers. This implies that
technology transfers to the local economy are more likely to originate from firms that have
acquired technology internationally. We find that being part of a multinational group makes
international  sourcing  more  likely  and  hence,  makes  technology  transfers  to  the  local
economy more probable. But this indirect effect is not sufficient to compensate for the direct
negative effect which being affiliated to an international group has on the likelihood of the
occurrence of local technology transfers. Having controlled for access to the international
technology market, foreign subsidiaries are less likely to be locally networked and transfer
technology locally. 
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to measure the effect of technology transfers
on (growth in) productivity of firms and industries of the local economy. However, given that
the wider body of existing empirical work on the effects of international technology transfers
on growth leaves inconclusive evidence (see Mohnen (2001)), we feel that distinguishing
between the issue of existence of technology transfers and the issue of their effects on growth
is an important first step for getting a clear view on this important relationship. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section we briefly review the
literature. Section 3 lays out the research question and discusses the sample. In Section 4 we
present the main results of our analysis on the determinants of local technology transfers
from manufacturing firms located in Belgium. Section 5 concludes.
2. Technology transfers to the local economy
The channels typically considered as channels of international technology spillovers
are  international  trade  in  goods  and  foreign  direct  investment  (see  Mohnen  (2001)  for  a
review). But international knowledge flows may also be traced through foreign technology
payments, i.e. licensing fees, royalties on copyrights, payments for consulting services, the
financing of R&D outsourced abroad, the acquisition of international targets in technology
sourcing M&As. And there are also spillovers without counter-payments such as through
international migration of people, informal international contacts, international conferences
or trade fairs, international research collaborations. 
Most empirical studies follow Coe and Helpman (1995) in measuring international
R&D spillovers via trade flows (a.o. Engelbrecht (1997), Keller (1998)). The results from
these studies are mixed: a number of studies using trade or no weights to aggregate foreign
R&D find mostly weak or insignificant returns to foreign R&D, while Coe and Helpman
2(1995)  find  strong  significant  foreign  R&D  elasticities.  More  recently,  empirical  and
theoretical models in International Trade have started to focus on the effects of MNEs on
output growth (see a.o. Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe (1998), Barell & Pain (1999),
Baldwin et al. (1999), Braconier et al. (1999). These empirical studies use FDI flows as
weights when summing the stock of foreign R&D, based on the notion that FDI increases the
proximity between sender and receiver of know-how and hence leads to higher spillovers.
The magnitude of spillovers is asserted from the return on foreign R&D, i.e. by how much
foreign R&D increases domestic output. Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
(1998),  combining  Coe  and  Helpman’s  data  with  data  on  inward  and  outward  FDI,  find
positive  output  elasticities  for  import-weighted  foreign  R&D  and  outward  FDI-weighted
foreign R&D, while inward FDI does not seem to matter. 
Another  strand  of  studies  at  the  industry  and  firm  level  infer  the  presence  of
international  knowledge  spillovers  from  changes  in  the  productivity  of  domestic  firms
associated with the “entry” of foreign subsidiaries. Note that without a direct measure of
technology transfers, these effects include not only technology transfers, but also the effect of
increased competition from the presence of affiliates. In one of the early contributions to the
literature on multinationals and host country benefits, Caves (1974) distinguishes between the
competitive effect and the technology diffusion effect. He finds that average profit rates are
lower in industries with a higher percentage of foreign subsidiaries. This result supports the
hypothesis of increased allocative efficiency. At the same time, he finds that in industries that
have a higher percentage of output produced by foreign owned firms, domestic owned firms
have higher value added per worker. This is consistent with domestic firms increasing their
technical efficiency and taking advantage of technology transfers by the multinational firms.
Fors (1997), using Swedish data, finds that parent R&D significantly influences host output
growth. But most of the firm level studies are for developing countries (a.o. Blomström
(1986), Fikkert (1997), Aitken & Harrison (1999), Blomström and Sjöholm (1999)). These
studies have generally failed to find robust evidence of positive knowledge spillovers from
multinational investment (see Blomström & Kokko (1998) for a review). Finding positive
spillover effects seems to require similarity between sender and receiver and an absorption
capacity of the receiver. Firms and countries must engage in own R&D to learn and to be able
to absorb foreign knowledge. 
Rather than assessing technology transfers through FDI and inferring them from
their effect on local productivity, scholars in search of further improvements of the empirical
literature, have recently turned to alternative, more direct, measures of technology transfers.
With patent data internationally comparable and accessible, patent citation information is
used to trace knowledge spillovers1. Patent citations can be used to assess both inter-firm
transfers between subsidiaries and local firms and intra-firm transfers between parents and
affiliates. Brandstetter (2000) uses patent citations to foreign subsidiaries by local firms to
measure international inter-firm knowledge spillovers through FDI. Using firm level data on
the impact of changes in Japanese firm-level FDI on USPTO patent citation counts, he finds
that Japanese FDI in the US is a significant channel of knowledge spillovers, i.e. increasing
the likelihood of patent citations both by the investing Japanese firm to indigenous US firms
and by the indigenous US firms to the investing Japanese firm. Almeida (1996), using patent
citations  on  foreign  subsidiaries  in  the  US  semiconductor  industry,  finds  that  patents
belonging to foreign firms located in the US are cited by local US firms more than expected,
3
1 The use of patent citations for knowledge spillovers has been pioneered by Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson
(1993). They use patent data to show that proximity matters and that being close to an external information
source increases the impact of spillovers from that source on own know-how.supporting positive technology transfers through FDI. Patent citation evidence on internal
technology transfers between affiliated partners, typically from headquarters to subsidiaries,
is less common. Frost (1998), using USPTO data for 1980-1990, found evidence for the
importance of headquarter patents for the innovations of subsidiaries. 
However, patent citations are only a partial measure for technology transfers if only
because not all innovations are patented. Survey level evidence provides more direct, be it
subjective,  evidence  of  technology  transfers  arising  through  affiliates  of  foreign  firms.
Mansfield  and  Romeo  (1980)  found  that  two  thirds  of  UK  firms  indicated  that  their
technological capabilities were raised by technology transfers from US firms to their overseas
UK subsidiaries. But only 20% felt that this effect was important.
3. Research Question and Sample
3.1. Research Question
Our research aims to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between FDI
and host market growth by focusing on the issue of the existence of technology transfers
through  FDI.  Previous  research  suggests  that  MNEs  can  be  considered  as  an  interesting
mechanism for international know-how diffusion. The local economy can access international
technology through foreign subsidiaries located within its boundaries. However, technology
transfers within and across firms and national boundaries remain a black box for researchers.
For FDI to be a channel for international spillovers, we need to assess first whether foreign
subsidiaries are sourcing technology internationally and second, whether foreign subsidiaries
transfer know-how to the local economy.
The first issue is whether firms that form part of a foreign-based multinational group
are more likely to acquire internationally available technology, compared to local firms. The
eclectic  theory  on  MNEs  (e.g.  Dunning  (1988))  typically  characterizes  the  MNE  as
possessing a superior ‘knowledge base’, which is an ownership specific advantage that can be
exploited in other markets through FDI, leading to transfers of know-how to the subsidiary
from the parent or other affiliated firms. In addition, subsidiaries may have easier access to
externally available international technology, using their group’s network of establishments
worldwide for technology sourcing. Especially the recent emphasis in the literature on the
more  active  role  of  subsidiaries  in  global  technology  sourcing  for  the  multinational
innovative strategy implies that subsidiaries are more innovation active and are more likely to
interact with their external environment, both nationally and internationally, with affiliated
and non-affiliated partners2.
While belonging to a multinational enterprise may provide access to an international
base of know-how, this access does not automatically imply a transfer to the local market.
This raises the second issue: whether foreign subsidiaries will transfer technology locally. In
case of licensing out or R&D contracting, the monetary returns are an obvious motive for
transferring technology. But, as the eclectic theory indicates, the MNE has typically chosen to
internalize  the  transfer  of  technology  through  FDI  rather  than  selling  its  technological
advantage to a local partner to avoid transaction costs and control competition. From this
4
2 For some recent studies, see the Research Policy Special Issue on the Internationalization of Industrial R&D,
1999, 2-3.perspective, MNEs may be less likely to transfer technology locally. But there is also a vast
amount  of  know-how  transferred  without  counter-payments  through  informal  contacts,
personnel  mobility,  etc.  While  part  of  this  know-how  flows  involuntarily,  reflecting  the
imperfect  appropriability  of  know-how,  firms  are  also  found  to  actively  nurture  these
informal flows. The motivation for the sender lies in the reciprocal access to know-how, i.e.
firms transfer know-how to be able to acquire technology in return (o.a. von Hippel (1988),
Schrader (1991)). The growing emphasis on the importance of networking and the formation
of alliances is driven by this mutual technology access motive. Teece (1997) and Mowery
(1992), for example, emphasize that alliances can be a particularly effective mechanism for
linking  external  technology  sources.  Technological  alliances  allow  firms  to  actively  and
voluntarily  manage  transfers  of  know-how  between  partners  (Pisano  (1990)),  reducing
transaction costs typically associated with market transactions (Oxley (1997)). Therefore, we
expect cooperative agreements between local firms and subsidiaries to include an important
technology transfer component.
In  this  paper,  we  want  to  link  international  technology  acquisition  to  local
technology transfer, testing whether foreign subsidiaries can more easily source technology
internationally  and  whether  foreign  subsidiaries  are  more  likely  to  transfer  technology
locally. Our analysis focuses on the question whether multinationals per se are important for
realizing technology transfers to the local economy, or whether this relies on these firms
sourcing on the international technology market. Of course, MNEs are only one mechanism
through  which  international  know-how  diffuses.  The  local  economy  can  benefit  from
international know-how through its own local firms buying technology internationally. This
allows  us  to  examine  whether  indigenous  firms  that  buy  technology  internationally  are
interesting alternative targets for the local economy for know-how diffusion. 
3.2. The sample
In an attempt to open up the black box on spillovers through FDI which trace know-
how flows within and across firm and national boundaries, the recent literature relies on
patent  citations  (see  e.g.  Frost  (1998),  Almeida  (1996),  and  Brandstetter  (2000),  all  on
USPTO data). But given the vast amount of information that is transferred without being
written down in patent applications or even in formal contracts, more qualitative direct firm
level  survey  data  remain  an  important  source  of  information.  Our  data  set,  which  is  the
Belgian subsample of EUROSTAT’s Community Innovation Survey for 1993, provides direct
survey  evidence  on  the  occurrence  of  international  technology  acquisition  and  local
technology transfers at the firm level. The advantage of our data is that they are direct and
firm-specific. A possible limitation is that they do not provide evidence on the importance of
these flows. Furthermore, they only record local transfers as perceived by the sender. The
Community  Innovation  Survey  contains  several  questions  on  the  technology  transfer  and
technology acquisition behavior of innovating firms3. Firms were asked about their use of
different mechanisms to acquire technology nationally and internationally, as well as the use
of  different  mechanisms  to  transfer  technology  nationally  and  internationally.  The
mechanisms identified for transfers and for acquisitions were: licensing, R&D contracting,
5
3 The survey intended to develop insights into the problems of technological innovation in the manufacturing
industry and was the first of its kind organized in many of the participating countries. A representative
sample of 1335 Belgian manufacturing firms was selected and the 13-page questionnaire was sent out to
them. The response rate was higher than 50% (748). The researchers in charge of collecting the data also
performed  a  limited  non-response  analysis  and  concluded  that  no  systematic  biases  could  be  detected
(Debackere and Fleurent (1995)).consulting, acquiring&selling (part of) companies, personnel mobility, and other informal
forms4. This information allows us to link national transfers of technology to international
technology acquisition. 
While the core of the analysis is presented in section 4, with an econometric analysis
of which firm characteristics drive transfers to the local economy, this section presents the
sample and some descriptive statistics connecting technology transfers to the local economy
with buying on the international technology market (see also Table A.1). Of the total Belgian
sample, which includes innovating and non-innovating firms, 28% (N=204) are subsidiaries
of a foreign-based international group (FSUB). Only 4% (N=25) of the sample companies are
Belgian headquarters. This distribution is very typical for a small and open economy such as
the Belgian economy, with little own multinationals but a pervasive representation of foreign
affiliated firms. Size is strongly and significantly correlated with the international orientation,
with foreign subsidiaries being on average more than double the size of local firms. With
respect to the distribution of firm types across industries, we find that local firms are over-
represented in food, textiles & clothing, wood & paper, and metals. Foreign subsidiaries are
over-represented in chemicals & pharmaceuticals, electronics, and cars.
In  line  with  the  industry  distribution  and  size  correlation,  belonging  to  an
international group is also strongly associated with innovation. The dummy variable INNOV
takes the value of 1 for firms that claimed to have introduced new or improved products or
processes in 90-92 and reported a positive budget for innovation. 55% of Belgian firms claim
to be innovation active. This includes the headquarter-type firms, which all innovate. For
foreign subsidiaries in Belgium, the percentage of firms claiming to be innovation active is
82%.  These  innovations  are  typically  not  simply  imported  but  are  associated  with  own
permanent R&D activities, since 70% of foreign subsidiaries in the sample are permanently
active in R&D. Again all Belgian headquarters are permanently R&D active. The dummy
variable MAKE takes the value of 1 for firms that report being permanently engaged in R&D
activities.  In  the  remainder  of  the  analysis,  we  will  have  to  restrict  the  sample  to  the
innovating companies, since the survey only provides information on knowledge flows for
this subsample. Note that this implies we may have a sample selection bias, which we will
deal with in the econometric analysis in section 4. 
3.3. Local transfers of technology
Table 1 shows that pure transfers of technology that remain in the local market
(TRANSFERnat) are relatively infrequent: only 80, or 18%, of the innovative firms in the
sample report having transferred technology locally. Although the percentage is somewhat
lower for foreign subsidiaries than for local firms, the difference is small. Transfers through
licensing (20), R&D contracting (25) and company sell-offs (10) are less frequent. The most
frequent mechanism reported as being used to transfer technology locally is “other, informal
contacts”  (43),  followed  by  consulting  advice  (38)  and  personnel  mobility  (35).  This
underscores the importance of informal transfers not necessarily related to counter-payments. 
6
4 Included in the sample was also the purchase/sale of equipment. We ignored the “embodied” purchase of
equipment, mainly because too many firms responded positively on this item. Probably not all of them
interpreted the question as buying equipment with the explicit purpose of obtaining new technologies as an
alternative to developing the technology internally. Including purchase did not alter the results, but slightly
reduced the significance.Table 1. Local Technological Transfer and International Technology Acquisition
TOTAL FSUB=0 FSUB=1
N=445 N=281 N=164
TRANSFERnat 80 (18.0%) 52 (18.5%) 28 (17.1%)
COOPEXnat 150 (33.7%) 82 (29.2%) 68 (41.5%)
BUYinat 259 (58.2%) 135 (48.0%) 124 (75.6%)
TRANSFERnat as % of 
firms with BUYinat 24.7% 28.9% 20.2%
TRANSFERnat as % of 
firms with MAKE 20.1% 21.2% 18.7%
COOPEXnat as % of 
firms with BUYinat 43.2% 39.3% 47.6%
COOPEXnat as % of 
MAKE 42.8% 39.7% 46.8%
Another mechanism through which technology can be transferred is cooperation in
R&D.  The  survey  allows  us  to  check  whether  partners  in  a  cooperative  agreement  are
national or international. Cooperation with local partners, COOPEXnat, includes competitors,
vertically linked firms and research institutes, but excludes affiliated partners, since we want
to  focus  on  external  transfers  to  the  local  economy5.  In  comparison  to  TRANSFERnat,
cooperation with local partners occurs more often (33.7%). The affiliates of foreign firms
have a higher incidence of local cooperative agreements as compared to local firms (41.5%
relative  to  29.2%).  Note  that  we  can  only  measure  the  incidence  of  occurrence  of  local
cooperation,  not  whether  there  are  transfers  of  technology  occurring  to  the  local  partner
through cooperation6, nor whether these transfers are important. In any case, cooperation,
providing mutual access to partner’s know-how, is a simultaneous transfer and acquisition of
technology. While 30% of foreign subsidiaries which are cooperating with local partners
report having transferred technology locally, 64% report having acquired technology locally,
indicating  that  acquiring  technology  is  a  major  concern  of  subsidiaries  engaged  in  local
cooperative agreements7.
BUYinat is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has reported having
acquired  technology  from  a  firm  located  outside  Belgium.  This  holds  for  58%  of  all
innovative sample firms. The most frequently reported mechanism is again “other informal
forms”  (143),  followed  by  licensing  (133)  and  R&D  contracting  (101).  Different  from
TRANSFERnat,  personnel  mobility  (65)  is  a  relatively  less  important  mechanism  for
7
5 The reported results are insensitive to this exclusion, using COOPnat rather than COOPEXnat.
6 In principle any transfer that occurs through such cooperative agreements should be recorded in our direct
measure TRANSFERnat. There is no explicit category for cooperative agreements in TRANSFERnat, but
“other,  informal”  means  should  be  picking  up  this  mechanism.  However,  of  the  150  firms  that  report
COOPEXnat, only 47 reported positively on TRANSFERnat, from which only 29 also report “other forms of
transfer” included in TRANSFERnat.
7 For the Belgian firms these numbers are, respectively, 32% and 76%.international acquisition of technology. Table 1 further shows that foreign subsidiaries have a
higher  frequency  of  acquiring  technology  internationally:  76%  of  all  innovation  active
foreign subsidiaries are acquiring technology internationally. We would expect that a large
part of these international technology acquisitions originate from their parent companies. Of
the  foreign  affiliates  located  in  Belgium  who  reported  having  acquired  technology  from
abroad, 66% indicated they had received international transfers within the group, from sister
or, typically, parent companies8.
A  next  step  in  the  analysis  is  to  examine  if  there  exists  a  link  between  the
international acquisition of technology and local technology transfer behavior. One would
expect that Belgium, being host to multinational companies, might benefit from the superior
access  that  these  firms  have  to  the  international  technology  market.  In  this  case,  FDI  is
indeed a channel of international technology spillovers for the local economy. Restricting
attention  to  companies  that  acquire  technology  internationally,  a  higher  frequency  of
transferring technology nationally emerges (see Table 1). About 25% of firms that acquire
technology internationally are simultaneously transferring technology nationally. This should
be  compared  to  the  average  18%  of  firms  transferring  locally.  They  also  have  a  higher
frequency  of  national  cooperation:  43%  of  the  companies  that  acquire  technology
internationally will also cooperate with national partners, as compared to 34% for the total
sample.  However,  especially  local  Belgian  firms  when  they  acquire  technology
internationally are more active in local technology transfer: 29% of the local firms that buy
technology internationally transfer technology locally. For foreign subsidiaries the frequency
of local technology transfer is only marginally higher in the subgroup of subsidiaries that are
acquiring technology internationally. The incidence of local cooperation increases both for
Belgian firms and foreign subsidiaries that acquire technology internationally. 
These first descriptive results are already indicative of the importance of access to
the international technology market, rather than being part of a multinational concern, for
explaining technology transfers to the host country, a result that will be further explored in
the econometric analysis of section 4.
4. Econometric evidence on firm characteristics conducive to local technology transfers  
In this section we explore the importance of the firms’ multinational profile for local
technology transfers in a multivariate regression analysis. A probit analysis on the likelihood
of local technology transfers (TRANSFERnat) is performed. Recall that the occurrence of
local technology transfers is not widespread. Given the higher frequency of occurrence of
cooperative agreements with local partners, we will also discuss COOPEXnat as a possible
mode of local technology transfer, although we have no direct evidence on whether and to
what  extent  technology  is  indeed  transferred  to  the  local  partner  in  such  cooperative
agreements. Central in the analysis will be the explicit transfer variable TRANSFERnat, since
this is a direct measure for spillovers. However, since cooperative agreements may be picking
up technology transfers beyond those recorded in TRANSFERnat (see footnote 6), we will
also discuss COOPEXnat, but only in the extensions in section 4.3. The Appendix contains a
detailed description of the variables included.
8
8 Both for selling and buying technology it was not possible to distinguish between technology transfers and
acquisitions within the boundaries of the multinational and external transfers and acquisitions.4.1. The econometric model
The focus of the analysis is on whether Foreign Subsidiaries (FSUB) are more or
less likely to transfer technology to the local economy (TRANSFERnat), correcting for other
determining  variables  such  as  size,  technological  origin  and  innovative  profile.  When
estimating  TRANSFERnat there  is  a  possible  sample  selection  bias,  since  we  only  have
information on TRANSFERnat for innovative firms and foreign subsidiaries are more likely
to be innovative (see Table 1). We use a Heckmann correction procedure specific for probits.
In  addition  to  whether  foreign  subsidiaries  are  more  or  less  likely  to  transfer
technology locally, we want to examine why foreign subsidiaries might be different. More
particularly we want to examine the role of international technology acquisitions in explaining
the probability that a firm will transfer technology locally. This will allow to check whether
any FSUB effect in TRANSFERnat is due to the differential international technology buying
behavior for foreign subsidiaries. This implies including BUYinat as explanatory variable in
TRANSFERnat and exploring which firm characteristics including FSUB determine BUYinat.
When including BUYinat in TRANSFERnat we have to correct for a possible error-in-variables
bias,  if  only  because  of  common  measurement  errors  or  other  unmeasured  common
determinants of BUYinat and TRANSFERnat. Such correlation causes a biased estimate of the
coefficient for BUYinat in TRANSFERnat, which is of central concern in the analysis. This
correction  is  done  by  including  the  generalized  residual  from  regressing  BUYinat  on  its
determinants  (Gouriéroux  et  al.  (1987)).  One  firm  characteristic  beyond  FSUB which  we
expect to be important in explaining BUYinat, is the internal R&D capability of the firm, as
captured by the dummy MAKE. First, internal R&D capabilities allow the firm to scan and
screen the external technology markets. Second, the internal R&D capabilities increase the
absorptive capacity of the organization to integrate external technology with own innovative
projects. Foreign subsidiaries, for instance, may need an internal R&D capability to adjust the
centrally developed innovations to their local market. When including MAKE in BUYinat, we
again have to correct for the possible error-in-variables bias due to correlation in error terms
between MAKE and BUYinat. Again we analyze the characteristics driving MAKE, which
includes examining whether FSUB are more likely to have an own R&D capacity.
In summary, the proposed model allows to not only identify the total effect of FSUB
on TRANSFERnat, but also to decompose this total effect into a direct component and an
indirect  component  running  through  BUYinat and  MAKE,  while  correcting  for  sample
selection for INNOV and a possible error-in-variables bias for BUYinat and MAKE. This leads
to the following set of equations:
Sample selection
INNOV = aiZ+biFSUB + ciZINNOV + einnov (0) 
Structural Form
MAKE = amZ+bmFSUB + cmmZMAKE + emake (1)
BUYinat = abZ+bbFSUB + cbbZBUYinat + dbMAKE +ebsc(MAKE)+ ebuyinat (2)
TRANSFERnat = astZ+bstFSUB + csttZTRANSFERnat + ftBUYinat + gtsc(BUYinat) + estransnat (3)
With 
Z= (SIZE, SIZEsq, SECTORDUMMIES)
ZINNOV= (OBSTneed, OBSTcost, OBSTlack)
ZMAKE= (OBSTinfo, OBSTcost, OBSTlack)
ZBUYinat= (EXTINF)
ZTRANSFERnat=(PROT)
Sc(MAKE)=generalized residual from (1)
Sc(BUYinat)=generalized residual from (2)
Reduced form 
TRANSFERnat = artZ+brtFSUB + crttZTRANSFERnat + cbtZBUYinat + cmtZMAKE + ertransnat (4)
9For  the  Heckmann  probit  sample  selection  for  INNOV we  can  only  include
explanatory variables which are available for the total sample. Besides FSUB, we include as
firm characteristics SIZE, measured by sales. Larger firms may have higher market power or
they may enjoy economies of scale which raise the payoffs to innovation activities. We also
include a quadratic term to account for non-linearities in this relation (SIZEsq). In addition,
the data allow to test whether obstacles to innovation are effectively preventing firms from
innovating, such as costs & risks (OBSTcost), a lack of innovation personnel (OBSTlack), no
interest from customers (OBSTneed). A number of industry dummies at the 2 and 3 digit
level of aggregation are included to correct for any technological opportunities or competitive
considerations that might give rise to more or less opportunities to innovate. 
Similarly  we  include  as  explanatory  variables  for  MAKE, FSUB,  size,  industry
dummies and a number of variables on obstacles to innovation. We include, beyond costs and
risks  (OBSTcost)  and  lack  of  innovation  personnel  (OBSTlack),  a  lack  of  market  and
technology information (OBSTinfo). The latter variable is expected to drive firms away from
external sourcing, resorting to an R&D strategy which relies on internal R&D inputs only.
Note that both INNOV and MAKE are estimated using the full sample, while TRANSFERnat
and BUYinat are only available for innovative firms9.
For BUYinat we include, next to FSUB and the size and sector variables, the internal
R&D capacity of the firm as proxied by the MAKE dummy. But since the error terms of
MAKE and  BUYinat  are  possibly  correlated,  we  include  in  the  BUYinat regression  the
generalized residual for MAKE from (1) (sc(MAKE)). As additional explanatory variable for
BUYinat we include the firm’s openness to generally available external know-how through
publications, patent information, seminars, conferences, trade shows (EXTINF). Openness
serves  as  a  catalyst  for  external  sourcing  by  providing  awareness  on  available  external
technological know-how 10.
In addition to whether the firm belongs to a foreign based multinational (FSUB), the
following control variables are included as explanatory variables for TRANSFERnat in the
structural form estimation (3). To test the importance of international spillovers, we include
whether the firm buys on the international technology market (BUYinat). The generalized
residual for BUYinat from (2) (sc(BUYinat)) is included to correct for the possible correlation
in error terms of TRANSFERnat and BUYinat. Firms that are larger in size, such as subsidiary
firms in the sample, may be more likely to generate local technology transfers (SIZE). A
quadratic size term is included, as well, to check for non-linearities (SIZEsq). Moreover, the
survey data allow us to include the effectiveness of protecting know-how, both through legal
mechanisms such as patents and through strategic mechanisms such as complexity, secrecy
and lead time (PROT). When the firm is better at protecting the rents from innovation, it is
expected to be better able to sell its know-how. Finally, a number of industry dummies are
included to correct for any technological opportunities or competitive considerations that
might  give  rise  to  more  or  less  technology  transfer  opportunities.  The  reduced  form
estimation of TRANSFERnat (4) contains all exogenous common and specific explanatory
variables for MAKE, BUYinat and TRANSFERnat. 
10
9 The Headquarter firms cannot be considered as pure local firms nor as foreign subsidiaries. Including a
separate dummy for headquarter firms is not possible given that all firms are innovation active and have
permanent R&D activities. Hence the 25 headquarter firms had to be eliminated in the analysis.
10 It is highly unlikely that all control variables are truly exogenous and uncorrelated with the error terms.
However, to keep the analysis tractable, we only correct for those variables whose coefficients are central to
the analysis.We can now decompose the total effect of FSUB on TRANSFERnat into a direct and
an indirect effect. The Total Effect is obtained from the reduced form for TRANSFERnat (4)
through the coefficient of FSUB (brt). The Direct Effect is obtained from the structural form
for TRANSFERnat (3) through the coefficient for FSUB (bst). The Indirect Effects through
BUYinat arise when foreign subsidiaries are more likely to acquire technology internationally
and acquiring technology internationally affects the probability to transfer technology locally.
The indirect effect is hence obtained from combining the coefficient for FSUB in BUYINAT
(bb) from (2) and the coefficient of BUYinat in TRANSFERnat (ft) from (3). There is also an
Indirect Effect through MAKE through BUYinat since foreign subsidiaries are more likely
to have a permanent R&D capacity, which makes them more likely to acquire technology
internationally, which in turn affects TRANSFERnat. This indirect effect is obtained from
combining the coefficient for FSUB in MAKE (bm) from (1) and the coefficient from MAKE
in BUYinat (db) from (2) and the coefficient from BUYinat in TRANSFERnat (ft) from (3).  
Both the structural form (3) and the reduced form (4) estimation of TRANSFERnat
are estimated with the Heckmann correction for INNOV using (0). In order to avoid having to
use recursively the Heckman correction term, we do not include the Heckman correction
procedure for BUYinat, but note that MAKE is estimated on the full sample. We also check
the scenario with a Heckman correction for BUYinat, in which case we do not correct for the
correlation between emake and ebuyinat. We also check the scenarios without sample selection,
the case of no correlation between ebuyinat,e stransnat,e make, and where MAKE directly influences
TRANSFERnat. These robustness checks are discussed in section 4.3 
4.2. The results
We start by discussing the reduced form for TRANSFERnat (see equation (4) in
Table 2). Our main interest is the coefficient for FSUB, which provides the total effect of
foreign subsidiaries on TRANSFERnat. This coefficient turns out to be negative, suggesting
that foreign subsidiaries are less likely to transfer technology to the local economy, all else
equal.  However,  the  effect  is  not  significant  (at  18%  only).  The  capacity  of  the  firm  to
appropriate the benefits from its innovation (PROT) gives the firm a better position as seller
on  the  technology  market,  leaving  a  significant  positive  coefficient  for  PROT in
TRANSFERnat. Also,  firm  size  is  positive,  although  not  significant.  For  the  industry
dummies (not reported), machinery and printing & publishing have a significantly lower
probability  of  transferring  technology  locally.  The  Heckmann  correction  procedure  for
sample selection bias on INNOV in TRANSFERnat, although not yielding a rho coefficient
which is significantly different from zero, confirms that foreign subsidiaries are more likely
to be innovative11. 
11
11 Size affects INNOV significantly positively, although at a diminishing rate. A lack of willingness to pay for
innovations (INFOneed) and a lack of innovative personnel (INFOlack) significantly prohibits innovation.
However  firms  which  perceive  costs  and  risks  as  barriers  to  innovation  (INFOcost) are  more  likely  to
innovate.  This  result  suggests  that  this  variable  seems  to  capture  awareness  to  obstacles  rather  than
effectiveness in blocking innovative purposes (see also Veugelers & Cassiman (1999)).Table 2. Econometric Results
Binomial  Probit  Model;  Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates;  Robust  estimations;  (Belgian
Headquarter  firms  deleted).  Robust  standard  error  in  brackets  and  significance  level
(***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% † significant at 15%)
All regressions include as independent variables the 14 industry dummies.  To save on
space, these coefficients are not reported.
MAKE BUYinat TRANSFER TRANSFER COOPEX COOPEX
nat nat nat nat
(structural) (reduced) (structural) (reduced)
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.961*** -1.259** -2.105*** -1.111 -1.024** -0.243
(0.307) (0.494) (0.452) (0.906) (0.485) (0.374)
SIZE 0.00075*** 0.00081*** -0.000040 0.00024 - 0.00005
(0.00027) (0.00028) (0.00021) (0.00026) -0.000351* (0.00015)
(0.000192
SIZESq -5.22E-08*** -6.11E-08*** 2.24E-08 -3.31E-09 3.87E-08** 5.31E-09
(1.95E-08) (2.15E-08) (1.6E-08) (1.89E-08) 08** (1.25E-08)
(1.6E-08)
FSUB 0.640*** 0.411* -0.582*** -0.372 -0.566*** -0.263**
(0.145) (0.248) (0.225) (0.279) (0.175) (0.138)
PROT 0.113 0.230** -0.022 0.092
(0.109) (0.107) (0.089) (0.089)
EXTINF 0.362*** 0.136 0.138
(0.106) (0.130) (0.110)
OBSTinfo 0.153* -0.069 0.039
(0.084) (0.143) (0.100)
OBSTcost 0.256*** -0.078 -0.157
(0.083) (0.206) (0.108)










Wald χ 2 124.6*** 70.55*** 62.48*** 33.3** 35.77** 10.38***
N=572 N=400 N=358  N=358 N=358 N=358
uncens/ uncens/ uncens/ uncens/
182cens 182cens 182cens 182cens
% correct predictions 73.1% 70.3% 82.1% 80.7% 68.2% 56.4%
(% correct prediction  (66.7%) (77.7%) (12.9%) (8.6%) (63.5%) (66.7%)
for DV=1)
Heckman Correction ρ 0.288 -0.052 [1] -0.758** -0.954*
(rse & sign level forχ 2 (.427) (.927) (.168) (.094) [2] 
test rho=0)
[1] The regression results for the Heckman correction for INNOV=.255(.210) + 0.0015(.0002)***SIZE
–9.95E-08(1.59E-08)***SIZEsq +0.459(.106)***FSUB -.396(.057)***OBSTneed
+0.485(.065)***OBSTcost -0.241(.059)***OBSTlack+industry dummies
[2] The regression results for the Heckman correction for INNOV=.088(.254) + 0.0016(.0002)***SIZE
–1.05E-07(1.55E-08)***SIZEsq +0.477(.114)***FSUB -.276(.105)***OBSTneed
+0.481(.065)***OBSTcost -0.284(.065)***OBSTlack+industry dummies
12The insignificant total effect for FSUB is the result of a direct and an indirect effect
with  opposite  signs.  The  direct  effect  for  FSUB on  TRANSFERnat is  obtained  from  the
structural equation (3), which shows a negative and highly significant coefficient for FSUB.
This  suggest  that  foreign  subsidiaries  are  less  likely  to  transfer  technology  locally  as
compared to Belgian firms, after correcting for the indirect effect through BUYinat. This
indirect effect through BUYinat is positive. As the coefficient of BUYinat in (3) shows, firms
which  acquire  technology  internationally  are  more  likely  to  transfer  technology  locally.
Furthermore, from equation (2) we see that foreign subsidiaries are significantly more likely
to acquire technology internationally. Hence, the indirect effect of FSUB on TRANSFERnat
through BUYinat is positive. This indirect effect can be further extended by including MAKE.
Foreign subsidiaries are significantly more likely to have an own permanent R&D activity, as
equation (1) shows. But having a permanent R&D activity does not affect the probability of
acquiring  technology  internationally,  as  the  insignificant  coefficient  of  MAKE in  (2)
indicates. Therefore, there is no significant indirect effect running through MAKE. Including
MAKE directly in TRANSFERnat also leaves no significant effect on TRANSFERnat, which
was already suggested by the non-significance of the explanatory variables for MAKE in the
reduced  form  of  TRANSFERnat. The  weak  role  which  the  permanent  R&D  dummy  is
displaying in the results can be related to the poor proxy we have available. This variable is
only a dichotomous variable, and the inclusion of other innovative profile variables is already
partly capturing specific aspects of innovative capacity, such as EXTINF and PROT. The
variable EXTINF shows up significantly positive in BUYinat, suggesting that firms which
have  an  organisation  that  is  more  open  to  publicly  available  external  information,  being
active in screening and scanning external innovations, are more likely to acquire technology
internationally. Firm size, which showed no direct effect on TRANSFERnat, leads however to
a significantly higher probability for BUYinat and also for MAKE, be it at a diminishing rate,
as the SIZEsq term indicates12.
When  estimating  the  model  on  the  individual  technology  transfer  mechanisms
separately, they all display a similar pattern of a significantly negative direct effect and a
significantly positive indirect effect of FSUB. But it is interesting to note that for “personnel
mobility” there is a highly significant (<1%) negative total effect, due to a strong negative
indirect  effect,  suggesting  that  foreign  subsidiaries  are  especially  more  likely  to  keep
personnel, thus preventing knowledge from leaking out13. Foreign subsidiaries are also less
likely  to  contract  out  R&D  to  local  firms,  as  compared  to  domestic  firms,  since  R&D
contracting displays a total negative effect which is significant at 5%.
The main result from the analysis so far is that foreign subsidiaries are more likely to
have  a  permanent  own  R&D  capability  and  are  more  likely  to  acquire  technology
internationally. Despite the fact that acquiring technology internationally leads to a higher
probability to transfer technology locally, this effect is not strong enough to compensate for
the direct negative effect which belonging to a foreign-based multinational firm has on local
technology transfers, such that overall foreign subsidiaries are not more likely to transfer
technology  locally.  These  results  do  not  seem  to  confirm  the  traditional  results  of  the
13
12 The obstacle-identifiers for MAKE are all significant: a lack of technological information leads firms to
ignore external sourcing, resorting more to internal development of innovations. Conversely, firms which
perceive  a  lack  of  qualified  innovation  personnel  are  constrained  in  using  internal  sourcing  to  develop
innovations. Costs and risks again show up positively in determining MAKE, suggesting higher awareness as
supra in INNOV. But also the high costs associated with acquiring external technology and the risk that the
acquired technology may not “deliver” to the receiving firm as expected may turn firms away from external
sourcing, relying on internal sourcing (see Veugelers & Cassiman (1999)).
13 For a model of technology spillovers from FDI through worker mobility, see Fosfuri et al. (2001).literature on multinationals, where MNEs are taken to be an important channel of technology
transfers. It suggests that companies operating within an international network of affiliated
companies  are  not  necessarily  interesting  sources  for  local  transfers.  What  seems  to  be
important  for  local  technology  transfers  is  having  an  international  network  that  provides
access to international technology. These results are robust across alternative specifications,
as the next section will demonstrate14.
4.3. Alternative Specifications and Extensions
4.3.1 Robustness checks
The first row of Table 3 repeats the basic results from Table 2, this time reporting
marginal probabilities for easy comparison and interpretation15. The following rows report
alternative  specifications  of  the  model.  Overall  the  main  results  are  very  robust  to  the
alternative specifications examined. The previous section could not provide strong evidence
for a sample selection bias for INNOV. Therefore we checked the results without Heckmann
correction procedure for TRANSFERnat (row (2)). This leaves similar results, be it that the
significance levels are improved, leaving a negative total effect which is significant at 10%.
Ignoring the possible correlation among error terms between BUYinat and MAKE
implies  estimating  BUYinat without  sc(MAKE), which  was  not  significant  in  the  basic
scenario (3). In this case (row (3)), MAKE is significantly positive in BUYinat, albeit only at
7%. This implies that the positive indirect effect from FSUB is further strengthened since
foreign subsidiaries are more likely to have a permanent R&D activity, which stimulates their
buying  of  international  technology,  which  in  turns  leads  to  a  higher  probability  of  local
technology transfers. Despite the augmented positive indirect effect through MAKE, the total
effect  of  FSUB remains  negative.  Taking  uncorrelated  error  terms  between BUYinat  and
MAKE implies  for  the  reduced  form  (4)  that  not  the  specific  explanatory  variables
from MAKE,  but  MAKE directly  is  included.  However,  in  line  with  its  insignificant
explanatory variables also, MAKE fails to be significant in explaining TRANSFERnat. Given
the weak results for MAKE, we also include the results when MAKE would be completely
ignored in the analysis (row (4)). The positive coefficient for FSUB in BUYinat remains
positive after excluding MAKE in BUYinat, but reduces the significance of the estimate16. It
only marginally affects the structural and reduced form for TRANSFERnat. 
14
14 Although  the  Wald  chi-sq  test  is  significant,  the  overall  predictive  power  of  the  regressions  on
TRANSFERnat is poor, as the % correctly predicted cases indicates. While overall 82.1% are correctly
predicted in the structural form (80.7% in the reduced form), the model has a tendency to overestimate the 0
cases: only 12.9% of the positive cases for TRANSFERnat are correctly predicted in the structural form
(8.6% in the reduced form), which is not so surprising given the overall low frequency of occurrence for
TRANSFERnat. For COOPEXnat, the percentage correctly predicted cases is 68.2% for the structural form
(56.4% for the reduced form), while 63.3% of the positive cases are correctly predicted in the structural
form (66.7% in the reduced form). Also for MAKE and BUYinat the percentage correctly predicted cases is
much higher overall, as well as for the positive cases.
15 Given that all the variables of interest are dummies this is for a discrete change in the dummy from 0 to 1.
16 When we exclude MAKE in BUYinat, we correct for a possible sample selection through the Heckman
correction for INNOV using (0).Table 3. Alternative results on direct and indirect effect for FSUB on TRANSFERrnat
Reported are the Marginal effect for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1
SCENARIO TOTAL DIRECT INDIRECT INDIRECT    INDIRECT 
EFFECT EFFECT EFFECT EFFECT EFFECT 
VIA BUYinat  VIA BUYinat VIA MAKE 
(A) (B) in BUYinat
(1) BASIC SCENARIO from Table 2:  -0.089 -0.065** 0.418*** .156* -0.035
Sc(MAKE) included in BUYinat;  (.100) (.032) (.146) (.091) (.320)
Heck Correct in TRANSFERnat
(2) No Heck Correct in  -0.078* -0.133*** 0.425*** .156* -0.035
TRANSFERnat (.042) (.043) (.131) (.091) (.320)
(3) Sc(MAKE) not included,  but -0.072 -0.067** 0.383*** .156*** .107*
MAKE included as identifier in  (.058) (.033) (.147) (.059) (.059)
BUYinat
(4) MAKE & Sc(MAKE) not -0.081 -0.061** 0.447*** .125
included; Heck Correct in BUYinat  (.063)  (.030) (.164) (.081) †
(5) Sc(BUYinat) not included in  -0.089 -0.077† 0.150*** .156* -0.035
structural form for TRANSFERnat;  (.100)  (.054) (.056) (.091) (.320)
(6) BASIC SCENARIO from Table 2:  -0.105** -0.188*** 0.779*** .156* -0.035
Sc(MAKE) included in BUYinat;  (.054)  (.054) (.132) (.091) (.320)
Heck Correct in COOPEXnat
TOTAL EFFECT = coefficient of FSUB in Reduced Form for TRANSFERnat (4)
DIRECT EFFECT = coefficient of FSUB in Structural Form for TRANSFERnat (3)
INDIRECT EFFECT via BUYINAT (A) = coefficient of BUYinat in Structural Form for TRANSFERnat (3)
INDIRECT EFFECT via BUYINAT (B) = coefficient of FSUB in Structural Form for BUYinat (2)
INDIRECT EFFECT via MAKE in BUYINAT = coefficient of MAKE in Structural Form for BUYinat(2);
Note that the marginal effect of FSUB in the structural form for MAKE (1) is for all scenarios 0.249(.054)*** 
Finally we check the scenario without the correction for correlation among error
terms  between  BUYinat  and TRANSFERnat,  which  implies  excluding  sc(BUYinat) in  the
structural form for TRANSFERnat, which was significant in the basic scenario (row (5)). This
does not affect the significance level, but does affect the size of the coefficient for BUYinat,
which suggests indeed that the correlation in error terms affects the point estimate of the
coefficient for BUYinat. It also affects the size and significance of the coefficient for FSUB,
leaving a direct effect which is still negative but only significantly at 16%.
4.3.2. Local technology cooperation
As indicated before, the incidence of technological cooperation with local partners is
much higher than the reported local transfers of technology. Such cooperative arrangements
can  be  interpreted  as  an  alternative  mechanism  through  which  know-how  is  exchanged.
Unfortunately we are unable to verify whether and to what extent know-how is transferred to
the local economy in such cooperative agreements. Although local know-how will also be
sourced  in  cooperative  agreements,  the  hope  is  that  such  cooperative  agreements
simultaneously imply a transfer of know-how to the local partner. Even though these transfers
should  in  principle  be  recorded  in  TRANSFERnat,  both  variables  are  not  strongly
correlated17. Therefore, we report the results using COOPEXnat as alternative dependent
15
17 The Pearson correlation coefficient between COOPEXnat and TRANSFERnat =0.25, significant at 1% level.
See also footnote 6.variable. Columns (5) and (6) in Table 2 report the structural and reduced form estimation for
COOPEXnat. The results are similar to TRANSFERnat. As (5) shows, the direct effect of
FSUB is significantly negative, but firms who BUYinat are more likely to cooperate with a
local partner. Despite the fact that foreign subsidiaries are more likely to acquire technology
internationally, the total effect on TRANSFERnat is negative and significant, as (6) shows.
The correction procedure for INNOV shows a Heckman correction rho which is significantly
different from zero. 
Table 4. BIVARIATE PROBIT for TRANSFERnat & COOPEXnat
(no Heckman Correction; sc(MAKE) and MAKE included in BUYinat and 
TRANSFERnat/COOPexnat) N = 377
SCENARIO TOTAL DIRECT INDIRECT INDIRECT  INDIRECT INDIRECT
EFFECT EFFECT EFFECT EFFECT  EFFECT EFFECT EFFECT
VIA VIA  VIA  MAKE  VIA  MAKE VIA MAKE
BUYinat BUYinat  In BUYinat
(A) (B) (A) (B)
TRANSFERnat  -0.336* -0.644** 2.172** [1] .411* -0.092 0.064 0.640***
(.179)  (.278) (.915) (.248) (.835) (.944) [2] (.145)
COOPEXnat 0.041 -0.618** 2.334*** .411* -0.092 1.751** 0.640***
(.166)  (.248) (.806) (.248) (.835) (.832) (.145)
Reduced form: Wald chi2= 110.73***;   ρ  = .395(.089)***; Structural form: Wald chi2= 135.74***; 
ρ  = .369(.093)***
TOTAL EFFECT= coefficient of FSUB in Reduced Form (4)
DIRECT EFFECT= coefficient of FSUB in Structural Form (3)
INDIRECT EFFECT via BUYINAT (A)= coefficient of BUYinat in Structural Form (3)
INDIRECT EFFECT via BUYINAT (B)= coefficient of FSUB in Structural Form for BUYinat (2)
INDIRECT EFFECT via MAKE (A)= coefficient of MAKE in Structural Form (3)
INDIRECT EFFECT via MAKE (B)= coefficient of FSUB in Structural Form for MAKE (1)
INDIRECT EFFECT via MAKE in BUYINAT= coefficient of MAKE in Structural Form for BUYinat(2);
[1]  Coefficient of scBUYinat from (3): -0.915(.549)* in TRANSFERnat and -1.177(.483)** in COOPexnat
[2] Coefficient of scMAKE from (4): -0.036(.537) in TRANSFERnat and -0.673(.472) in COOPexnat
The error terms of the two variables for local technology transfer, TRANSFERnat
and COOPEXnat, are very likely to be correlated, given omitted common factors such as
measurement  error,  in  which  case  a  bi-variate  probit  analysis  is  appropriate.  The  results
reported in Table 4 show a rho value for correlation among error terms, which is significantly
different from zero both in the structural and in the reduced form estimation, underscoring the
importance  of  correction  for  the  correlation  in  error  terms  among  TRANSFERnat and
COOPEXnat. But the main results are confirmed in the bivariate probit. We find again a
direct effect for FSUB which is negative both for TRANSFERnat and COOPEXnat. This
contrasts  with  an  indirect  effect  which  is  positive.  We  find  again  that  firms  which  are
acquiring technology internationally are more likely to both TRANSFERnat and COOPEXnat
which yields a positive indirect effect for FSUB given that foreign subsidiaries were more
likely to acquire technology internationally. In addition, there is a significant indirect effect
through MAKE for COOPEXnat: Firms that have a permanent R&D activity are more likely
to cooperate in R&D with local partners. Since foreign subsidiaries have a higher probability
to be permanently engaged in R&D, this creates an indirect positive effect for FSUB in
COOPEXnat.  There  is  no  significant  indirect  effect  of MAKE through BUYinat.  All  this
implies  that  for  TRANSFERnat  the  positive  indirect  effects  are  not  strong  enough  to
16compensate the negative direct effect for FSUB, such that, in total, foreign subsidiaries are
significantly less likely to transfer technology locally, as found supra. For COOPEXnat, the
positive  indirect  effect  combining  the  effects  of  international  technology  acquisition  and
permanent R&D activities are stronger, leaving a total effect which is no longer negative but
nevertheless fails to show up significantly positive. 
Overall, the evidence for foreign subsidiaries seems to be more favorable for local
cooperation.  However,  the  positive  indirect  effect  which  foreign  subsidiaries  generate
through MAKE could also be suggesting the use of an internal R&D capacity to be better able
to  absorb  know-how,  rather  than  for  the  transfer  of  know-how  in  local  cooperative
agreements. Conclusions on the use of local cooperative agreements should wait for a more
direct identification of the direction of flows of know-how within such agreements.
4.3.3. Internal transfers from headquarters to subsidiaries
A  final  extension  further  explores  the  nature  of  international  technology
acquisitions. A robust finding throughout the analysis has been that foreign subsidiaries are
more likely to acquire technology internationally, causing a positive indirect effect for FSUB.
This can be due to the internal transfers of technology that are occurring from the parent to
the subsidiary, but could also be due to larger access to external international sources of
technology.  Unfortunately,  we  cannot  disentangle  BUYinat into  internal  and  external
acquisition, but the survey contains a set of questions relating to the importance of different
sources  of  information  for  the  innovation  process  of  the  firm.  This  includes  for  foreign
subsidiaries the importance of parent or affiliated companies as sources of information for
their innovations, which allows to split the foreign subsidiaries according to whether they
report these internal sources to be important or crucial for their innovations or not: IFSUB
and  NIFSUB respectively.  61.5%  of  innovation  active  foreign  subsidiaries  report  internal
within-group  transfers  to  be  important  or  crucial  as  a  source  of  information  for  their
innovative  activities.  Rather  than  including FSUB and  BUYinat in  local  transfer
(TRANSFERnat and COOPEXnat), we estimate the reduced form and the structural form
including IFSUB and NIFSUB 18.
The results are very much in the line with the results reported before. The total effect
for FSUB is only significantly negative for NIFSUB, i.e. foreign subsidiaries for which the
internal transfers of technology from foreign affiliated partners are not important. For foreign
subsidiaries for which these transfers are important to crucial, both the direct effect and the
total  effect  never  show  up  significantly  negative.  In  summary,  the  results  suggest  that
companies  operating  within  an  international  network  of  affiliated  companies  could  be
interesting  sources  for  local  technology  transfers,  but  only  when  they  can  benefit  from
internal transfers of technology from their parents or from other international sources.
17
18 Given that for foreign subsidiaries most of the international technology acquisition is internal (cf supra), this
makes it difficult to include simultaneously the internal transfer measures and BUYinat as measures of
external international technology acquisition.Table 5. BIVARIATE PROBIT for TRANSFERnat & COOPEXnat (no Heckman Correction; MAKE
endogeneous in TRANSFERnat/COOPexnat; N=379
TOTAL TOTAL  DIRECT DIRECT    DIRECT
EFFECT EFFECT EFFECT EFFECT  IN  EFFECT 
IFSUB NIFSUB IFSUB NIFSUB VIA MAKE
TRANSFERnat [1]    -0.135 -0.724*** -0.124 -0.752** 0.158
(.202)  (.288) (.329) (.318) (.917) [2]
COOPexnat 0.091 -0.046 -0.361 -0.350 2.131***
(.191)  (.213) (.312) (.247)(15%) (.831)
Reduced form: Wald chi2= 116.43***;  ρ = .409(.089)***; Structural form: Wald chi2= 123.15***;  
ρ = .412(.089)***
[1] In reduced form also SIZE & PROT are significant (<10%) both in TRANSFERnat and COOPexnat; in
structural form  PROT remains significant in TRANSFERnat.
[2] Coefficient of scMAKE from (4): 0.067(.530) in TRANSFERnat & -0.719(.481) in COOPexnat.
5. Conclusions
External  knowledge  is  an  important  input  for  the  innovation  process  of  firms.
Increasingly, this knowledge is likely to originate from outside of their national borders. This
explains the preoccupation of policymakers in stimulating local technology transfers coming
from international firms. In the existing literature this has typically been framed as a search
for multinational firms, which are presumed to transfer international technology to the host
country. Using Belgian company data from the Eurostat Community Innovation Survey, this
paper examines directly the technology flows occurring through foreign subsidiaries and/or
firms  acquiring  internationally  available  know-how  and  assesses  their  impact  on  the
likelihood of technology transfers to the host economy. 
Some important results emerge. First, firms belonging to an international network of
affiliates have a higher probability of having a permanent R&D base and are more likely to
source technology internationally. Second, access to international technology is an important
driver  for  local  technology  transfers.  Firms  that  successfully  source  technology
internationally can appropriate the rents from their enhanced know-how by selling on the
local  technology  market.  And  with  respect  to  informal  transfers,  where  the  motive  is
reciprocal access to know-how, firms that buy technology internationally are more interesting
partners  to  interact  with  locally  because  of  their  enhanced  know-how.  Third,  having
controlled  for  the  acquisition  of  technology  internationally,  foreign  subsidiaries  have  a
significant negative direct effect on local technology transfers. This negative direct effect
corresponds to the internalisation decision of the parent firm, which allows it to better control
know-how  flows.  Foreign  subsidiaries  may  have  lower  incentives  to  transfer  technology
locally, especially when the host market is not an attractive candidate for providing reciprocal
access  to  know-how  as  compared  to  other  location  sites.  Fourth,  the  significant  positive
indirect effect for foreign subsidiaries through their higher international technology sourcing
is not strong enough to compensate for the negative direct effect, leaving a total effect for
foreign subsidiaries on local technology transfers which is negative in the sample. Hence, if
companies operating within an international network of affiliated companies are interesting
18sources for local technology transfers, as most of the literature suggests, this is only if they
have larger international sourcing activities. Our results suggest that in order to stimulate
local technology transfers, local firms with the capacity to source technology internationally
should  not  be  ignored.  Unfortunately,  local  firms  are  less  likely  to  have  an  international
network  from  which  to  acquire  technology,  as  compared  to  foreign  subsidiaries.  Finally,
cooperation with local partners is an important channel for the host country to benefit from
technology  transfers.  At  least,  it  is  reported  more  frequently  than  local  transfers  of
technology.  The  common  policy  stance  favoring  their  formation  through  special  legal
provisions  or  subsidizing  them  through  special  programs  seems  attractive  for  stimulating
access  to  external  know-how.  But  since  cooperation  typically  involves  a  reciprocal
relationship, this implies that the issue of simultaneously receiving and transferring know-
how cannot be ignored. This motive for reciprocal access is not only relevant for cooperation
but also for the large component of other informal technology transfers in the total set of
transfer mechanisms considered in the analysis.
In summary, these results seem to suggest that Belgium, as an open economy, is
likely to gain from internationally operating firms, but only to the extent that these firms have
a higher probability of sourcing technology internationally. It is this higher probability of
international technology sourcing which has a significant positive effect on the probability of
local transfers. An important implication of these results is that the trend towards subsidiaries
with a more pivotal role in the multinational’s innovation strategy, and with more discretion
to use the MNE structure to source know-how globally, can therefore be expected to generate
more technology diffusion to the local economy. However, since foreign subsidiaries are
typically more engaged in international networks for exchanging know-how, they may have
less interest in local networks for exchanging know-how. 
Before  the  results  of  this  study  are  molded  into  firm  conclusions  about  MNEs’
innovation strategies and host governments’ innovation policy, more work is needed to test
the robustness of these results. First, technology transfers to the local economy might occur
through many other formal and informal channels in addition to the ones perceived by the
sender and recorded in our sample. Second, our data only reveal whether or not a firm is
active in transferring technology locally. Information about the intensity of these technology
transfers  would  be  necessary  for  any  definitive  conclusions  about  the  importance  of  the
degree  of  international  exposure  for  local  technology  transfers.  More  importantly,  the
analysis  should  be  extended  beyond  whether  technology  flows  occur  or  not,  towards
assessing  the  efficiency  of  such  flows  and  their  impact  on  innovative  performance  and
growth. Furthermore, the full Eurostat CIS-I data would allow us to compare results across
EC countries. This would give us the opportunity to go beyond the Belgian sample and
identify possible host market characteristics that might influence the results.
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FSUB Dummy  variable  with  value  1  when  the  company  is  a  subsidiary  with
foreign headquarters.
IFSUB Dummy  variable  with  value  1  when  the  company  is  a  subsidiary  with
foreign  headquarters  and  reports  information  from  affiliated  firms  as
‘important to crucial’ for its innovations.
NIFSUB Dummy  variable  with  value  1  when  the  company  is  a  subsidiary  with
foreign headquarters and reports information from affiliated firms as not to
be ‘important to crucial’ for its innovations.
COOPEXnat Dummy variable with value 1 for innovative firms that have cooperation in
R&D  with  a  Belgian  non-affiliated  partner,  where  both  parties  have  an
active involvement.
TRANSFERnat Dummy variable with value 1 for innovative firms transferring technology
to  a  firm  located  in  Belgium  through  licensing  and/or  through  R&D
contracting  and/or  through  consultancy  services  and/or  sale  of  another
enterprise  and/or  mobility  of  skilled  employees  and/or  other  forms  of
transfer.
BUYinat Dummy variable with value 1 for innovative firms acquiring technology
from a firm located outside Belgium through licensing and/or through R&D
contracting and/or through consultancy services and/or purchase of another
enterprise and/or hiring skilled employees and/or other forms of acquiring
technology.
SIZE Firm Sales in 1010 BEF.
SIZEsq Firm Sales in 1010 BEF squared.
INNOV Dummy variable with value 1 when the firm developed or introduced new
or  improved  products  or  processes  in  the  last  2  years  AND  reported  a
positive budget for innovation expenditures.
MAKE Dummy variable with value 1 when the firm has permanent R&D activities.
EXTINF Average  of  scores  of  importance  of  following  information  sources  for
innovation process (number between 1 (unimportant) and 5 (crucial)):
1. Patent information
2. Specialized conferences, meetings and publications
3. Trade shows and seminars
(rescaled between 0 and 1)
22PROT PROT is  Average  of  scores  of  effectiveness  of  following  methods  for
protecting new products/processes (number between 1 (unimportant) and 5
(crucial)):
1.Patents 




(rescaled between 0 and 1)
OBSTcost  Average of scores of Importance of Cost and Risk Obstacle for innovation
by the firm
risks too high
no suitable financing available
high costs of innovation
pay-back period too long
innovation cost hard to control
uncertainty about introduction times
OBSTinfo  Average of scores of Importance of Lack of Information for Innovation as
an Obstacle to innovation by the firm
lack of information on technology
lack of market information
OBSTlack Average of scores of Importance of Lack of Personnel for Innovation as an
Obstacle to innovation by the firm
lack of qualified personnel
lack of personnel to innovate
OBSTneed Average of scores of Importance of No Need for Innovation as an Obstacle
to innovation by the firm
no need for innovation because of earlier innovations
little interest for innovations by customers
INDUSTRY DUMMIES
STEEL STEEL = 1 if firm is in Steel sector (NACE Codes: 22).
MIN MIN = 1 if firm is in Minerals (NACE Codes: 24).
CHEM CHEM = 1 if firm is in Chemicals (NACE Codes: 24, 25exc 2571-2572).
FARMA FARMA = 1 if firm is in Pharmaceuticals (NACE Codes: 2571-2572).
MET MET = 1 if firm is in Metals (NACE Codes: 31).
MACH MACH = 1 if firm is in Machinery (NACE Codes: 32).
ELEC ELEC = 1 if firm is in Electrical Equipment Industry (NACE Codes: 33,
34, 37).
TRANS TRANS = 1 if firm is in Transportation Equipment (NACE Codes: 35,36).
FOOD FOOD = 1 if firm is in Food & Drink Business (NACE Codes: 41, 42).
TEXT TEXT = 1 if firm is in Textiles (NACE Codes: 43).
CLOTH CLOTH = 1 if firm is in Clothing, Shoes & Leather (NACE Codes: 44, 45).
WOOD WOOD = 1 if firm is in Wood & Furniture (NACE Codes: 46).
PRINT PRINT = 1 if firm is in Paper & Printing (NACE Codes: 47).
RUBB RUBB= 1 if firm is in Rubber & Plastics (NACE Codes: 48).




INNOV 445 (62.3%) 281 (54.7%) 164 (82.0%)
MAKE 318 (44.5%) 179 (34.8%) 139 (69.5%)
OBSTlack 2.26 2.29 2.19
OBSTneed 2.16 2.20 2.07
OBSTinfo 2.43 2.47 2.35
OBSTcost 2.80 2.79 2.83




OBSTlack 2.21 2.24 2.16
OBSTneed 2.02 2.02 2.02
OBSTinfo 2.46 2.5 2.40
OBSTcost 2.89 2.87 2.94
EXTINF 2.85 2.77 2.99
PROT 2.66 2.52 2.87
SIZE 699.6 586.5 894.0
24